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Firms have discretion on financial reporting under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or GAAP. The 
proliferation in recent years of earnings metrics that deviate from GAAP figures confounds investors' ability to 
compare firm financial performance. Non-GAAP (or pro forma) figures usually do not include certain balance sheet 
or income statement items that are required under GAAP. Regulators and accounting standard-setting body are 
concerned that pro forma financial measures have been used by management to mislead investors by overstating or 
smoothing earnings or to meet Wall Street earnings expectations. On the other hand, management asserts that by 
excluding certain nonrecurring and noncash items, pro forma earnings are more relevant in measuring firm 
performance. Indeed, prior empirical studies provide evidence that certain pro forma measures may have incremental 
information content over GAAP earnings. Pro forma earnings are typically unaudited and the quality of disclosures 
accompanying such measures varies across firms. This paper develops an analytical (mathematical) model to examine 
whether firms will exhibit higher credibility through auditor selection when disclosing pro forma earnings. This study 
extends prior empirical literature by providing an analytical perspective on the importance of attestation performed 
by auditors regarding pro forma earnings. The model in this study suggests that managers who possess superior 
information than shareholders in an asymmetric information setting and expect high future earnings are more likely 
to engage large auditors when disclosing pro forma earnings. As such, the model may explain the voluntary disclosure 
of accounting information by managers in capital markets. 
 





ecent empirical studies suggest that non-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) or pro 
forma earnings may proxy for a firm’s ongoing profitability and are useful in firm valuation. 
Management determines pro forma earnings by excluding some items from income determined under 
GAAP (Barth, Gow & Taylor, 2012; Baumker, Biggs, McVay & Pierce, 2014; Curtis, McVay & Whipple, 2014; 
Doyle, Jennings & Soliman, 2013; Huang & Skantz, 2016; Isidro & Marques, 2015). 
  
U.S. firms have discretion to a certain extent on financial reporting under GAAP. The proliferation in recent years of 
earnings metrics that deviate from GAAP figures confounds investors' ability to compare firm financial performance. 
Pro forma figures typically do not include some balance sheet or income statement items that are required under 
GAAP. These excluded items are usually non-cash or non-recurring costs such as impairment on assets, restructuring 
charges, and amortization of intangibles. Financial statements based on GAAP, by contrast, show accruals and one-
time or non-recurring costs in measuring and assessing firm performance. Companies used varied adjustments to 
calculate pro forma earnings. The absence of consistency in how companies calculate pro forma earnings is a major 
concern. The proliferation of pro forma measures attracts the attention of various stakeholders in financial reporting, 
including investors, regulators, standard-setters, auditors, and the media (Chen, Krishnan & Pevzner, 2012; Cormier, 
Lapointe-Antunes & Magnanl, 2011; Dutta, Caplan & Marcinko, 2014. 
 
Regulators and accounting standard-setting body are concerned that pro forma financial measures have been used by 
management to mislead investors by overstating or smoothing earnings or to meet Wall Street earnings expectations. 
The practice can hurt the relevance and reliability of financial reporting. The tradeoff between relevance and reliability 
in accounting measurement is a main concern when firms disclose pro forma performance measures (Cormier et al. 
R 
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2011; Dutta et al. 2014). On the other hand, management asserts that by excluding certain nonrecurring and noncash 
items, pro forma earnings are more relevant in firm valuation. It is also not surprising that pro forma earnings tend to 
be higher than GAAP earnings and the difference between the two measures is in most cases highly significant. 
Consequently, the practice allows management to portray company performance more favorably when compared to 
GAAP figures (Isidro & Marques, 2015). 
 
Indeed, prior empirical studies provide evidence that certain pro forma measures may have incremental information 
content over GAAP earnings. Pro forma earnings are perceived as more permanent than GAAP earnings because they 
exclude charges that are unlikely to recur in the future. As such, pro forma measures can provide useful information 
to evaluate a firm’s future performance or to assess a firm's future cash flows and thus provide more value-relevant 
information than GAAP measures (Baumker et al. 2014; Curtis et al. 2014). Additionally, pro forma earnings or other 
measures are typically unaudited and the quality of disclosures accompanying such measures varies across firms. Prior 
empirical studies also suggest that investors may benefit from increased consistency in reporting pro forma measures, 
enhanced transparency in their computation, and assurance provision. Because pro forma figures may be disclosed by 
companies to manage investors’ perceptions, the credibility of the disclosure must be inferred in the capital markets 
through observable firm attributes (Bierstaker, Monahan & Peters, 2013; Chen et al. 2012;). 
 
This paper develops an analytical model to examine whether firms engaging with differential attribute of auditors will 
be perceived as providing more credible disclosure of pro forma accounting earnings. This study extends prior 
empirical literature by providing a mathematical modeling framework on the importance of attestation performed by 
auditors regarding pro forma measures. Analytical model is adopted in this study because the model can provide 
insights into settings involving strategic interactions of managers, shareholders, and auditors in an asymmetric 
information setting. 
 
The following describes the economic environment of the model, development of the model structures, results and 




The basic structure of the model is that the manager of a firm selects an observable but costly act to signal the future 
earnings prospect of the firm to uninformed shareholders in the capital market. The underlying structure is the 
existence of information asymmetry in which the manager has better information about the firm's future earnings than 
shareholders. The manager in the model is motivated to disclose superior information of earnings prospect by selecting 
an auditor in attesting pro forma earnings. 
 
The economic environment embodied in the model consists of: 
 
a. The manager has better knowledge about the firm’s future earnings prospect in an asymmetric 
information setting. 
b. The compensation scheme for the manager is designed by the shareholders to motivate the manager in 
disclosing assessment of the firm's earnings through voluntary disclosure of pro forma earnings. 
c. The manager's compensations depend on both the current market value of the firm and actual earnings 
realized in the future by the firm. 
d. The manager reveals the superior information by selecting an auditor who attests to the firm's disclosure 
of pro forma earnings. 
e. Auditors have differential exposure to losses in litigation initiated by shareholders when they believe 
that they are misled by misrepresentations in the financial statements in the case of lower than expected 
future earnings realized by the firm. Larger audit firms such as the Big 4 have more resources and thus 
will assume a larger share of the loss in case of litigation. The various size of the auditor as selected by 
managers is therefore a signal to indicate the magnitude of the higher or lower expected earnings than 
pro forma earnings disclosed. 
f. Larger audit firms or auditors charge a higher audit fee to reflect their higher share of the loss in litigation 
against them and managers of the firms. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research –September/October 2021 Volume 37, Number 5 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 121 The Clute Institute 
At the beginning of a single period with two consumption points, the manager selects an auditor to attest to the pro 
forma earnings so as to maximize the manager's expected utility. This action is observed by the shareholders and share 
price is determined conditional on selection of auditor by the manager. At the end of the period, the firm’s earnings 
figure is revealed to the manager, auditor, and shareholders. 
 
The manager compensation scheme M is represented by: 
 
Μ = 𝛼$	𝑉$(𝐾)) + ,
𝛼-𝑋 𝑖𝑓	𝑋 ≥ 𝑃𝐹-
0 𝑖𝑓	𝑃𝐹- > 𝑋 ≥ 𝑃𝐹6




a0  = Proportion of the firm received by the manager at beginning of the period. 
a1  = Proportion of the firm that the manager receives at end of the period. 
V0(KA) = Current value of the firm which is dependent on auditor A selected by the manager. 
KA  = Audit fee (on a per hour basis) charged by the auditor selected. 
X  = The firm’s earnings. 
X ~ N(µ, σ²) = Earnings are assumed to be normally distributed. 
PF1  = Pro forma earnings threshold above which realized earnings figure is classified as "good" and a bonus 
is awarded to the manager. 
PF2 = Pro forma earnings threshold below which realized earnings figure is classified as "bad" and a penalty 
or punitive payment P is imposed on the manager through litigation by shareholders. 
 
Utility function of the manager’s consumptions C0 and C1 over the beginning and the end of the period respectively is 
represented by a negative exponential (denoted by "exp") function which includes f, the risk tolerance level in the 
manager’s consumption C1 at the end of the period. 
 
𝑈(𝐶$, 𝐶-) = 𝑈(𝐶$) − exp(−Φ𝐶-) 
 
There are A number of auditors in the market and each auditor sets the audit fee per hour KA according to the auditor’s 




0 𝑖𝑓	𝑃𝐹6 	≤ 𝑋
𝑅(𝑆)) 𝑖𝑓	𝑃𝐹6	 > 𝑋
 
 
The loss function LA of the auditor is dependent on the size SA of the auditor because deep pocket is typically associated 
with large auditors and hence a large auditor is more able to pay for shareholders’ losses in case of litigation. The 
number of an auditor’s clients increases as the auditor’s size increases. It follows that the probability of litigation will 
go up at an increasing rate due to a larger fraction of bad earnings firms that are among the auditor’s clients. 
 
The loss function of the auditor therefore increases with size because there is an increase in the chance or probability 
of litigations associated with the auditor’s ability to recover losses and its larger proportion of clients that report bad 
earnings. Furthermore, the loss function's rate of change increases with the auditor size due to a drastic increase in the 
number of clients that report bad earnings (which means that the probability of litigation also increases).  
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To complete an audit of the pro forma earnings, an auditor of any size requires H number of billing hours. 
 
To establish the manager’s expected utility maximization equation, at the beginning of the period the manager is 
endowed with Ĉ consumption units and the manager invests the excess units (such as the bonus received) in risk-free 
assets which generate return of Rf. The total investment in the risk-free asset by the manager is denoted by F. 
  
Thus, the maximization of expected utility of the manager subject to the budget constraint is formulated as: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒	𝐸⌊𝑈(𝐶$, 𝐶-)⌋ = 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒	{𝐸𝑈(𝐶$) + 𝐸𝑈[−exp(−Φ𝐶-)]} 
{𝐾), 𝐹}  {𝐾), 𝐹}	 
 
Subject to 𝐶$ + 𝐹	 = Ĉ	 + 𝛼$𝑉$(𝐾))  
 
where 𝐶$ is the manager’s consumption at the beginning of the period and 𝐶- is the consumption at the end of the 
period. 𝐶- is equal to: 
 
𝐶- = 𝐹𝑅V + ,
(𝛼$ + 𝛼-)𝑋 𝑖𝑓	𝑋	 ≥ 	𝑃𝐹-
𝛼$𝑋 𝑖𝑓	𝑃𝐹- > 𝑋 ≥ 𝑃𝐹6	
𝛼$𝑋 − 𝑃 𝑖𝑓	𝑃𝐹6 > 𝑋
 
 
The budget constraint (in the subject to) is rearranged as: 
 
𝐶$ = 	Ĉ + 𝛼$𝑉$(𝐾)) − 𝐹 
 
The maximization problem is therefore written as: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒	𝑇 = 	𝑈-XĈ + 𝛼$𝑉$(𝐾)) − 𝐹Y 
{𝐾), 𝐹}  














The above maximization equation can be simplified to: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒	𝑇 = 	𝑈-XĈ + 𝛼$𝑉$(𝐾)) − 𝐹Y 
{𝐾), 𝐹} 















In deriving the formal model, a few known properties of the normal distribution are adopted: 
 





}nb` 		 then   ∫ f(x)dx
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if  (i)  f(x) = ∫ -
t6ru
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Because earnings as indicated are normally distributed, X ~ N(µ, σ²), the maximization equation can now be expressed 
as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒	𝑇 = 	𝑈-XĈ + 𝛼$𝑉$(𝐾)) − 𝐹Y 
{𝐾), 𝐹} 
 
 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝&−ϕF𝑅*+ exp{𝑍1}𝑁 4
–PF1+	µ	
σ
5 −ϕ(𝛼8 + 𝛼:)σ 
 
 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝&−ϕF𝑅*+ exp{𝑍2}𝑁 4
–PF1+	µ	
σ
5 + ϕ𝛼8σ 
 
 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝&−ϕF𝑅*+ [exp{ϕP} − 1] exp{𝑍2}𝑁[
PF2–	µ	
σ
] + ϕ𝛼8σ 
 
where  
𝑍1 = −ϕ(𝛼0 + 𝛼1)𝜇 +
1
2 f
2(𝛼0 + 𝛼1)2σ2 
 





Defining Z  = 𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝑍1}𝑁 –#w	µ	
s










The maximization problem becomes: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒	𝑇 = 	𝑈-XĈ + 𝛼$𝑉$(𝐾)) − 𝐹Y − 𝑒𝑥𝑝[−ϕ𝐹𝑅𝑓^𝑍 
{𝐾), 𝐹} 
 
Given that the manager selects auditor A, the firm's current value is determined by its discounted earnings with a 
discount rate D. The market value of the firm V0(KA) is thus derived from the following valuation model (recall that 






The Journal of Applied Business Research –September/October 2021 Volume 37, Number 5 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 124 The Clute Institute 
Equilibrium in signaling can be attained, after the issuance of the manager’s signal, when shareholders determine the 
firm’s market value unambiguously (i.e., there is no noise in the signal). Therefore, it implies that at equilibrium: 
 
𝐸(𝑋|𝐾)) = 𝜇 
 









Substitute the above valuation model equation into the maximization problem above:  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒	𝑇 = 	𝑈-XĈ + 𝛼$𝑉$(𝐾)) − 𝐹Y − 𝑒𝑥𝑝[−ϕ𝐹𝑅𝑓^𝑍 
{𝐾), 𝐹} 
 













σ  − H} 
 
The optimal value K∗  wich maximizes the above equation 
£¤
£!









This optimal value of K∗  in auditor selection implies that the incremental dollar paid to the auditor is equal to the 
incremental earnings accrued to the firm from the auditor selection in the case that the realized earnings fall below the 
threshold, PF2, of bad earnings performance. 
 
The above equation, £F(G!
∗ )
£!
∗  , which provides the optimal value of K∗  is differentiated with respect to μ to gain insight 






































 in the above equation needs to be determined because all other terms in the 
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"  is now proved to be greater than zero from the following derivation:  
 
The auditor determines the billing KA in order to recover for possible losses in a litigation. KA increases with the size 
of the auditor. It therefore follows that the rate of change in the billing decreases with size because a large auditor is 
more diversified with a broad base of clients and hence, the less the auditor is required to increase the billing rate. 
 
Following the above reasoning, it follows that E
"!
EG!
" < 0  and the derivative of the inverse function has a positive sign: 
E"(G!)
E!
" > 0. 
 
Therefore, for the equation   E!
∗
Er










it implies that E!
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The next section discusses the derived comparative statics of the model: E!
∗
Er
 > 0 and E!
∗
E§
 > 0 and the implications of 
the model with respect to the signaling effect of auditor selection by a firm's manager when voluntarily disclosing pro 
forma earnings. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL 
 
The model in this study shows that the selection of an auditor allows a firm manager to signal high accounting earnings 
of the firm when voluntarily disclosing pro forma earnings information. The implication from the comparative statics 
of the model is that manager will engage with a larger auditor when the manager expects higher future earnings when 
disclosing pro forma earnings. Selecting a large auditor would allow the shareholders to recover their losses from the 
auditor in case of subsequent bad realized earnings. However, the manager does not benefit directly from the recovery 
of losses and the manager is interested in only providing a signal of high expectation of future earnings to the 
shareholders through the selection of a large auditor. Furthermore, a larger audit fee is needed to engage a large auditor. 
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Consequently, a manager will pay a larger audit fee only because the manager intends to signal a higher expectation 
of future earnings of the firm to the capital market participants.  
 
The model suggests that a manager who possesses superior information than shareholders in an asymmetric 
information setting and expects high future earnings is more likely to engage an auditor when the manager discloses 
pro forma measures such as accounting earnings. As such, the model may explain the voluntary disclosure of 
accounting information observed in the capital market. The model also shows that the selection of an auditor by 
manager of a firm to attest pro forma information may strengthen the credibility in both the content of the disclosure 
as well as the signal itself when disclosing pro forma earnings. This indicates that the disclosure itself can convey 
meaningful information in firm valuation and the magnitude of such disclosure is significant in relation to the 
manager’s expectations about future earnings prospect of the firm. 
 
To empirically verify the results of the model, a researcher can partition firms according to expected (and subsequent 
realized) earnings or cash flows. Then the frequency of voluntary disclosure of pro forma earnings or other accounting 
measures is examined to test whether firms with high expected earnings are engaged with large auditors than firms 
with auditors smaller in size. That is, three variables can be examined and controlled for in an empirical study: the 





U.S. firms have discretion on financial reporting under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or GAAP. The 
proliferation in recent years of earnings metrics that deviate from GAAP figures confounds investors' ability to 
compare firm financial performance. Non-GAAP (or pro forma) figures usually do not include certain balance sheet 
or income statement items that are required under GAAP. Regulators and accounting standard-setting body are 
concerned that pro forma financial measures have been used by management to mislead investors by overstating or 
smoothing earnings or to meet Wall Street earnings expectations. On the other hand, management asserts that by 
excluding certain nonrecurring and noncash items, pro forma earnings are more relevant in measuring firm 
performance. Indeed, prior empirical studies provide evidence that certain pro forma measures may have incremental 
information content over GAAP earnings. However, pro forma earnings are typically unaudited and the quality of 
disclosures accompanying such measures varies across firms. 
 
This study adopts a mathematical modeling approach to examine whether firms exhibit higher credibility through 
auditor selection when disclosing pro forma earnings. The model in this study shows that the selection of an auditor 
allows a firm manager to signal high accounting earnings for the firm when voluntarily disclosing pro forma earnings 
information. The analytical results also suggest that a manager who possesses superior information than shareholders 
in an asymmetric information setting and expects high future earnings is more likely to engage an auditor when the 
manager discloses pro forma accounting earnings. This study extends prior empirical literature by providing a different 
perspective on the importance of attestation performed by auditors regarding pro forma earnings. Analytical model is 
adopted in this study because the model can provide insights into settings involving strategic interactions of managers, 
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